For state actors, the sea constitutes a medium that allows projecting security beyond one's own external boundary, for which the projection of power and forces is central (e.g. forward presence, carrier air strikes, and amphibious operations). However, projecting security through the sea goes beyond national security objectives to include human, societal, regional, and global security concerns, since naval operations are not restricted to interstate wars (e.g. humanitarian operations, naval diplomacy). In addition, projecting security is also about projecting norms into the maritime domain and onto the land.
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The projection of security
The concept of projection is central to the expanded notion of security that has prevailed since the end of the Cold War. However, it did not emerge suddenly after 1991 and has been the concern of military planners since ancient times. It was traditionally referred to as the projection of (military) forces or the projection of power, and thus mainly linked to the notion of war; projecting forces and power was of strategic, operational, or tactical value, with the aim of forcing the victory in war. This is still the case today in the event of military operations. However, projection has also become a notion of peacetime. Projection is not restricted to military operations and should be understood comprehensively as the 'projection of security'. This expression is relatively new and has mainly been used since 1999 to acknowledge the EU's move towards a global security role beyond its external boundaries, in line with Javier Solana's 1999 speech in Berlin:
We also have to be prepared, where necessary, to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders. (Solana, 1999) As argued by Anne Deighton, the projection of security should be understood in relation to internal security: 'a state, or the EU, cannot project security without itself being secure and, conversely, it may have to project a security policy to preserve internal security' (Deighton, 2000: 48) . As a response to the broadening and deepening of the security agenda, the projection of security goes beyond national security interests and objectives.
To secure the threatened object, and consequently to fight the threatening subject (cf. chapter 1), the post-Cold War security policies put the emphasis on the projection of security 'upstream', that is to say, preemptively, rather than in response to an attack/issue (which corresponds to the conceptual evolution from defence to security), and beyond states' boundaries (which corresponds to the deterritorialisation of security). In other words, one's own security depends on others' security and on one's own capacity to 'bring security' to others. States assume that projecting security outside, abroad, and 'upstream' allows obtaining security inside, home, and 'downstream'. Consequently, the projection of security as defined by states and regional organisations in the 21st century has two components: a spatial one, that is, the need to tackle the threats as far away from home as possible, and a temporal one, that is, the need to deal with crises and threats at an early stage or as soon as possible. In terms of security, the bigger the distance (d) between 'home' and the place where threats are tackled the better and the smaller the period of time (t) needed to tackle the threats the better. For any type of security threats i (e.g. piracy, terrorism, regional conflict), it is possible to define a security index S i by the formula:
where S o is the reference security index for a type of threat i, d i is the distance from 'home' at which threat i is tackled (i.e. projection distance) with d o as an average distance, and t i is the time period for tackling such a type of threat (i.e. tackling time) with t o as average time. This formula allows us to grade the security threats according to the distance from 'home'. It gives a security index of S o for a standard threat and will double for twice the distance or half the time. It will also tend to zero if the threat lasts long or if it materialises within one's boundary. This is illustrated in Figure 4 .1, which represents the evolution of the security index S i as function of tackling time t i for different projection distances d i . It shows that the security index decreases with time wherever the threat is located, but also that keeping the threat abroad by tackling it beyond
